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THE IMPORTANCE OF DRUG QUANTITY IN FEDERAL 
SENTENCING: HOW CIRCUIT COURTS SHOULD DETERMINE 
THE MANDATORY MINIMUM SENTENCE FOR CONSPIRACY TO 
DISTRIBUTE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES IN LIGHT OF UNITED 
STATES V. STODDARD 
Elizabeth McKinley 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Each day, nearly half of all individuals serving sentences in federal 
penitentiaries are drug offenders.1 That equates to approximately 77,000 
inmates.2 These staggering numbers continue to remain high as more 
and more individuals are being charged, convicted, and sentenced for 
federal drug crimes.3 A majority of the individuals serving sentences for 
drug offenses received a mandatory minimum sentence.4 One of the 
most prevalent mandatory minimum sentence statutes that drug 
offenders are charged under is 21 U.S.C. § 846,5 otherwise known as the 
attempt or conspiracy statute.6  
Many federal circuits have disagreed on the proper approach for 
determining the quantity of drugs used to establish the mandatory 
minimum sentence for an individual convicted on the charge of 
conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance. Multiple circuits have 
held that the mandatory minimum for conspiracy to distribute should be 
based on the amount of drugs attributable to the conspiracy as a whole. 
However, other circuits have held that the amount of drugs attributable 
or reasonably foreseeable to the defendant is the proper basis for the 
 
 1. FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS, BOP Statistics: Inmate Offenses 
https://www.bop.gov/about/statistics/statistics_inmate_offenses.jsp (last updated Jan. 29, 2019). 
 2. Id.  
 3. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2011 Report to the Congress: Mandatory Minimum 
Penalties in the Federal Criminal Justice System, Chapter Eight: Mandatory Minimum Penalties for 
Drug Offenses at 152, https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/news/congressional-testimony-and-
reports/mandatory-minimum-penalties/20111031-rtc-pdf/Chapter_08.pdf (2011) (“In fiscal year 2010, 
drug offenses were 28.0 percent of the reported cases [to the Commission], with 23,964 offenders 
convicted of a drug offense.”); see also, BOP Statistics: Inmate Offenses, supra note 2.  
 4. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2017 Overview of Mandatory Minimum Penalties for Drug 
Offenses in the Federal Criminal Justice System, at 4 (Oct. 2017) 
https://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-
publications/2017/20171025_Drug-Mand-Min.pdf [hereinafter U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2017 
Overview] (“Among drug offenders in federal prison as of September 30, 2016, almost three-quarters 
(72.3%) were convicted of an offense carrying a mandatory minimum penalty, and more than half 
(50.4%) remained subject to that penalty at sentencing.”). 
 5. 21 U.S.C. § 846 (LexisNexis, Lexis Advance through PL 115-385, approved 12/21/18, with 
a gap of PL 115-334). 
 6. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2017 Overview, supra note 5, at 15-16.  
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mandatory minimum. The most recent court to uphold the use of this 
individualized approach is the District of Columbia Circuit in United 
States v. Stoddard.7 This Note asserts that every federal circuit court 
should determine the mandatory minimum sentence for an individual 
convicted of conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance based on the 
amount attributable or reasonably foreseeable to the individual 
defendant rather than the amount attributable to the conspiracy as a 
whole. Part II of this Note provides a background of the federal drug 
offenses and the federal conspiracy statute under the United States 
Code. Further, Part II discusses the split among the Federal Circuits 
regarding the appropriate method to determine the mandatory minimum 
for an individual convicted of conspiracy to distribute a controlled 
substance. Finally, Part II concludes by examining the circuits that have 
recently questioned their use of the conspiracy-based approach.  
Part III of this Note discusses why the individual based approach is 
the proper method to determine an individual’s mandatory minimum 
sentence for conspiracy to distribute. First, this section will discuss why 
the legal rationale set forth by the D.C. Circuit in United States v. 
Stoddard is the proper interpretation of Supreme Court and district court 
precedent to determine whether the individualized or conspiracy-based 
approach should be utilized. Second, Part III will examine various 
policy reasons that support the individualized approach, including: (1) 
instances of the Government’s support of the individualized approach 
and (2) the data on the immense number of individuals serving prison 
terms for drug offenses with lengthy mandatory minimum sentences. 
This section ends by discussing the current shift in some circuits toward 
the adoption of the individualized approach in determining the 
mandatory minimum for conspiracy to distribute.  
Finally, Part IV concludes that because precedential case law and 
strong policy reasons support the use of the individualized approach, all 
Circuits should adopt this method of determining the mandatory 
minimum sentences for conspiracy to distribute drugs. Additionally, this 
section calls on circuits that still utilize the conspiracy-based approach, 
including the Sixth Circuit, to change the law and formally adopt the 
individualized approach. 
II. BACKGROUND  
A. Conspiracy and the Drug Offenses  
An individual can be charged under the United States Code with the 
 
 7. United States v. Stoddard, 892 F.3d 1203, 1219 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
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crime of attempt to commit an act or conspiracy.8 Section 846 states that 
“[a]ny person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense defined 
in this subchapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those 
prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of 
the attempt or conspiracy.”9 When an individual is charged with 
conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, 21 U.S.C. § 841 
proscribes the specific base drug offense and the subsequent penalties.10 
21 U.S.C. § 841(a) states that “it shall be unlawful for any person 
knowingly or intentionally – (1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, 
or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a 
controlled substance.”11 To determine the penalties for a violation of 21 
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), courts must look to § 841(b) to determine the 
corresponding penalty for the specific controlled substance at issue and 
the weight of that substance.12 While this statute gives guidance to 
courts on the maximum penalties for the specific types and weights of 
drugs a defendant possesses, circuit courts are ideologically split on how 
to determine the amount of drugs upon which to base the defendant’s 
mandatory minimum sentence under § 841. 
B. Calculating the mandatory minimum based on quantity of controlled 
substance attributable to the conspiracy as a whole 
Some circuits are of the opinion that to determine a defendant’s 
mandatory minimum sentence for conspiracy to distribute a controlled 
substance, courts should base the amount of drugs used for sentencing 
purposes on the amount of drugs attributable to the conspiracy as a 
whole.13 In United States v. Knight,14 the Seventh Circuit held that the 
defendant’s sentence of life in prison for conspiracy and possession was 
proper because the jury determined that each defendant participated in 
the conspiracy and the type and amount of drugs attributable to the 
conspiracy, while the judge “determined the drug quantity attributable to 
that particular defendant and sentenced him accordingly.”15       
In Knight, the two defendants, Knight and Williams, created a 
 
 8. 21 U.S.C. § 846.  
 9. Id.  
 10. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (LexisNexis, Lexis Advance through PL 115-385, approved 12/21/18, with 
a gap of PL 115-334). 
 11. Id. § 841(a)(1).  
 12. Id. § 841(b). 
 13. E.g. United States v. Phillips, 349 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 2003), vacated on other grounds, 
Barbour v. United States, 543 U.S. 1102 (2005); United States v. Knight, 342 F.3d 697 (7th Cir. 2003) 
 14. Knight, 342 F.3d 697 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 15. Id. at 712.  
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conspiracy to traffic cocaine from California to Wisconsin.16 Knight, 
“the organizer and leader” of the drug conspiracy and Williams, “his 
second in command,” recruited many individuals to act as “couriers and 
dealers” who transported and distributed the drugs to other individuals.17 
One courier was arrested and stated that she received her supply of 
drugs from Knight and Williams.18 Thereafter, the two were arrested and 
charged, in part, with both conspiracy to distribute and possession of a 
controlled substance with the intent to distribute.19 During the trial, the 
jury was instructed to “determine each defendant’s guilt on each count” 
and then, “once guilt was established, whether the offense charged 
involved five or more kilograms of cocaine.”20 The jury found Knight 
and Williams guilty of conspiracy and, under the guidelines of the 
statute, the defendants were both sentenced to life in prison, the 
maximum punishment that either defendant was able to receive for the 
charge of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances. 21 
On appeal, Knight and Williams argued that the jury instructions 
were “erroneous” due to the rationale set forth in the Supreme Court 
case, Apprendi v. New Jersey,22 arguing that there is a requirement for 
the jury make an individualized finding of fact of the amount and type 
of drug for which each defendant is responsible instead of finding that 
the amount of drug involved in the conspiracy exceeded the amount 
prescribed by the statute.23 The Seventh Circuit, however, held that the 
jury instruction was not erroneous as the jury determined not only that 
the defendants’ were part of the conspiracy, but also that the prosecution 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt a specific quantity of drugs 
attributable to the entire conspiracy.24 Additionally, the Seventh Circuit 
found that the trial judge properly sentenced the defendant’s based on 
the amount he determined was attributable to each individual defendant, 
as the amount attributable to each defendant was the entire amount 
attributable to the conspiracy as a whole.25  
In Knight, the Seventh Circuit adopted the conspiracy-based approach 
from the First Circuit’s previous reasoning in Dernman v. United 
 
 16. Id. at 701.  
 17. Id. at 701-702.  
 18. Knight, 342 F.3d at 703.  
 19. Id. Two other defendants, Newton and Durant, were also charged with conspiracy and tried 
with Knight and Williams. Id. at 703-04. 
 20. Id. at 704.  
 21. Id.  
 22. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 23. Knight, 342 F.3d at 709.  
 24. Id. at 712.  
 25. Id.  
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States,26 which stated that the jury must only make the determination of 
whether an individual was involved in a conspiracy and any factors that 
may increase the statutory maximum penalty, while “the judge may 
lawfully determine the drug quantity attributable to that defendant and 
sentence him accordingly” within that prescribed statutory maximum 
determined by the jury’s findings.27 The Seventh Circuit agreed with the 
Dernman rationale which posited that there is no requirement under the 
holding of Apprendi that a jury must use the individualized approach in 
“findings of drug type and quantity in drug-conspiracy cases.”28 The 
Knight court did find, however, that there was “overwhelming 
evidence” that each of the defendants played important roles in the 
conspiracy and specifically possessed, or had knowledge that other 
individuals in the conspiracy possessed, many kilograms of cocaine.29 
Therefore, the court found that each defendant was responsible for “the 
full weight of drugs involved [in the conspiracy].”30  
C. Calculating the mandatory minimum based on quantity of controlled 
substance that was “reasonably foreseeable” to each individual 
defendant  
On the contrary, many circuits have held that in determining the 
mandatory minimum sentence for conspiracy to distribute a controlled 
substance, a sentence should be based on the quantity of drugs that was 
attributable or “reasonably foreseeable” to the individual defendant.31 
The First Circuit recently held that the jury must be the finder of fact 
who determines the quantities of controlled substance upon which the 
mandatory minimum and statutory maximum are based.32 In United 
States v. Pizarro, the defendant, Pizarro, was convicted on charges of 
conspiracy to distribute various types of controlled substances33 and was 
sentenced to life in prison.34 When determining the amount of controlled 
substances attributable to Pizzaro, the district court judge determined 
there was sufficient evidence to find that Pizarro was accountable for 
more than the “five kilograms or more of cocaine or one kilogram or 
 
 26. Derman v. United States, 298 F.3d 34 (1st Cir. 2002). 
 27. Knight, 342 F.3d at 710 (citing Derman v. United States, 298 F.3d 34, 42-43 (1st Cir. 2002)).  
 28. Knight, 342 F.3d at 710.  
 29. Id. at 712.  
 30. Id.  
 31. E.g., United States v. Pizarro, 772 F.3d 284 (1st Cir. 2014); United States v. Rangel, 781 
F.3d 736 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v. Haines, 803 F.3d 713 (5th Cir. 2015); United States v. 
Banuelos, 322 F.3d 700 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 32. Pizarro, 772 F.3d at 293. 
 33. Id. at 287.  
 34. Id. at 288.  
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more of a mixture or substance containing heroin”35 and thus should be 
sentenced to the maximum of life.36 Pizarro appealed his sentence37 and 
argued that “the district court committed an Alleyne error by applying a 
mandatory minimum sentence without the requisite drug quantity 
findings by the jury.”38 On appeal, the First Circuit rationalized the 
holding under Alleyne v. United States,39 finding that “the drug quantity 
that triggers the mandatory minimum for a 21 U.S.C. § 846 conspiracy 
must be found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”40 The court further 
specified that the “conspiracy-wide quantity . . . governs the statutory 
maximum” while “the individualized quantity, i.e. the quantity that is 
foreseeable to the defendant, … triggers the mandatory minimum.”41 
Based on this rationale, the court held that that the jury did not make a 
finding of fact on the quantity of drugs reasonably foreseeable to 
Pizarro; therefore, the lower court erred in Pizarro’s sentencing.42 
The Fifth Circuit also adopted the individual-based approach in 
United States v. Haines.43 In Haines, the defendants, Haines, Porter, and 
Iturres-Bonilla, were charged in part with “conspiracy to possess with 
intent to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin.”44 The defendants 
were convicted based on the jury finding that the entire conspiracy 
“involved one kilogram or more of heroin.”45 The district court found 
that this finding of fact by the jury “triggered the statutory minimum of 
twenty years for Haines and Porter.”46 On appeal, two of the defendants, 
Haines and Porter, challenged the district court’s use of the conspiracy-
based approach in determining the quantity of controlled substance for 
sentencing rather than the jury making the finding of fact of the quantity 
of controlled substance attributable to each individual defendant.47 On 
appeal, the government agreed with the defendants that the district court 
should have based the sentence on the individualized approach but 
believed that the Fifth Circuit’s precedent supported the conspiracy-
 
 35. Id. (“court found Pizarro accountable for more than 150 kilograms . . . .”). 
 36. Id.  
 37. Pizarro, 772 F.3d at 289-290. 
 38. Id. at 289-290 (stating that the appeal was on “the convictions for the aggravated offenses 
with enhanced drug quantities under § 841(b)(1)(A),” Pizarro, 772 F.3d at 290). (emphasis added?) 
 39. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013). 
 40. Pizarro, 772 F.3d at 292. 
 41. Id. at 292-93.  
 42. Id. at 293.  
 43. United States v. Haines, 803 F.3d 713 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 44. Id. at 719-20.  
 45. Id. at 720.  
 46. Id.  
 47. Id.  
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wide approach.48  
Finding for the defendants, the Haines court held that the defendants’ 
sentences should have been “based on the drug quantity attributable to 
them as individuals” and thus vacated the defendants’ sentences as the 
jury made no finding of fact with regard to the quantity attributable to 
each individual defendant.49 The court rationalized this shift away from 
Fifth Circuit precedent by determining that the Supreme Court opinions 
in Apprendi and Alleyne require a finding by the jury of factors that 
increase a defendant’s sentence.50 The court found that because “the 
quantity of the controlled substance can ‘significantly increase the 
maximum penalty[,]’” the quantity of heroin attributable to each 
defendant was a fact that should have been determined by the jury.51 
D. United States v. Stoddard52 
The most recent decision in which a circuit court shifted from using 
the conspiracy-based approach to the individualized approach is the 
District of Columbia Circuit’s decision in United States v. Stoddard.53 In 
2012, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) was investigating the 
heroin-trafficking activities of Jermaine Washington.54 The FBI 
observed Washington’s activities by utilizing various methods of 
surveillance, including drug-buys by a confidential informant, a wiretap, 
surveillance, and recorded phone conversations.55 During this 
surveillance, the FBI recorded phone conversations between 
Washington and two individuals, Sidney Woodruff and Calvin Stoddard, 
and observed Washington meeting with the two aforementioned 
individuals.56 Further, the FBI obtained conversations between 
Washington and Jerome Cobble.57 Subsequently, when the FBI 
conducted a search of Washington’s residence, it found over 20 grams 
of heroin, drug paraphernalia, and thousands of dollars in cash.58 
Washington then pled guilty to multiple charges including conspiracy to 
distribute a controlled substance and agreed to be a cooperating witness 
 
 48. Haines, 803 F.3d at 738.  
 49. Id. at 739.  
 50. Id. at 738.  
 51. Id. at 738-39.  
 52. Stoddard, 892 F.3d 1203 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
 53. Id.  
 54. Id. at 1208.  
 55. Id.  
 56. Id.  
 57. Stoddard, 892 F.3d at 1208.  
 58. Id. at 1208.  
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for the government.59 
A grand jury indicted Calvin Stoddard, Jerome Cobble, and Sidney 
Woodruff with conspiracy to distribute 100 grams or more of heroin in 
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846 in conjunction with additional 
charges.60 During the trial, Washington testified against Stoddard and 
recounted various conversations where he and Stoddard discussed 
purchasing heroin as well as instances where Washington sold heroin to 
Stoddard.61 After both the Government and the defense rested their 
cases, the court denied the defendants’ motions for acquittal and 
proceeded with the jury instructions.62 When contemplating the jury 
instructions, the Government proposed that the jury determine the 
amount of drugs the jury believed to be attributable to each specific 
defendant.63 The district court, although cognizant of other circuits that 
followed the individualized approach, determined that it was appropriate 
to “use a verdict form without individualized drug quantity 
determinations.”64  
When issuing a verdict, “[t]he jury found Woodruff and Stoddard 
guilty of the drug-conspiracy charge and found that the conspiracy, as a 
whole, involved 100 grams or more of heroin.”65 The defendants then 
moved for a new trial, arguing that the jury should have been instructed 
to determine the amount of controlled substance attributable to each 
individual defendant rather than finding the amount of controlled 
substance attributable to the entire conspiracy.66 While the Government 
opposed the defendants’ motion for a new trial, it agreed that the jury 
should have been given the instruction to “find the amount attributable 
to each defendant” and the defendants’ sentence should not have been 
based on “the 100 grams the jury found attributable to the conspiracy as 
a whole.”67 The district court ultimately rejected the defendants motion 
for a new trial.68 During sentencing, Woodruff and Stoddard again 
raised the issue that the amount of controlled substance utilized in 
determining the mandatory minimum and statutory maximum for 
sentencing should not be based on the quantity attributable to the entire 
conspiracy.69 The Government agreed again in their sentencing 
 
 59. Id.  
 60. Id.  
 61. Id. at 1209.  
 62. Stoddard, 892 F.3d at 1210.  
 63. Id.  
 64. Id.  
 65. Id.  
 66. Id. at 1210-11.  
 67. Stoddard, 892 F.3d at 1210-11.  
 68. Id.  
 69. Id. at 1211.  
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memorandum with the defendants’ proposition.70 
On appeal, both Woodruff and Stoddard again raised the issue that 
their sentences were improperly calculated based on the amount of 
controlled substance attributable to the conspiracy as a whole rather than 
the amount a jury should find attributable to each of them individually.71 
Upon review, the D.C. Circuit confirmed that the jury instructions 
mandated that the jury find that the defendants’ had “entered a 
conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance containing heroin” and 
that the amount of that controlled substance in the conspiracy was 
greater than 100 grams.72 The court further established that jury 
instructions did not charge the jury with finding that “it was ‘reasonably 
foreseeable’ to each defendant that 100 grams or more would be 
distributed within the scope of the conspiracy.”73 The D.C. Circuit held 
that the “reasonably foreseeable” approach was the proper approach to 
use when determining the mandatory minimum for conspiracy to 
distribute a controlled substance and, thus, vacated the defendants’ 
sentences.74  
In arriving to this position, the Stoddard court first reviewed their 
own precedent in United States v. Law,75 which held that a violation of § 
846 “encompasses all of the crimes reasonably foreseeable within that 
conspiracy” and thus “a defendant convicted of conspiracy to deal 
drugs, in violation of § 846, must be sentenced, under § 841(b), for the 
quantity of drugs the jury attributes to him as a reasonably foreseeable 
part of the conspiracy.”76 The Stoddard court found that this reasonably 
foreseeable principle in Law was applicable in the determination of drug 
quantity for sentencing.77 The court then looked to Supreme Court 
precedent that supported the decision in Law and the utilization of the 
individualized approach.78 The first Supreme Court case the Stoddard 
court reviewed was Burrage v. United States,79 which held that a jury 
must make the factual finding that a death resulted from a controlled 
substance under § 841(b)(1) before a mandatory minimum sentence 
could be imposed upon a defendant for that crime.80 The Burrage court 
determined that because the death enhancement increased the mandatory 
 
 70. Id.  
 71. Id. at 1218.  
 72. Stoddard, 892 F.3d at 1219.  
 73. Id.  
 74. Id.  
 75. United States v. Law, 528 F.3d 888 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 76. Stoddard, 892 F.3d at 1221 (citing Law, 528 F.3d at 906).  
 77. Stoddard, 892 F.3d at 1221-1222.  
 78. Id.  
 79. Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014). 
 80. Stoddard, 892 F.3d at 1219 (citing Burrage, 571 U.S. at 210).  
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minimum sentence of the controlled substance charge, it is necessary for 
a jury to make a specific finding as to that fact.81 Similarly, the Stoddard 
court held that this principle was applicable to the issue “of a 
mandatory-minimum drug quantity” as the quantity of a controlled 
substance is a fact that increases a sentence.82 Next, the court 
rationalized the Burrage issue under the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Alleyne v. United States.83 In support of its deviation from First Circuit 
precedent, the court then noted that many circuits who continue to 
follow the conspiracy-wide approach have begun to question whether 
that approach is correct in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Alleyne.84 Finally, the Stoddard court stated that their individual based 
approach was supported by instances of the Government urging other 
circuits to reconsider the use of the conspiracy-wide approach and 
because the Government’s “charging policy employs the individualized 
approach.”85 
E. Circuits that are re-examining their precedents  
Recently, some circuit courts have begun to re-examine their use of a 
conspiracy-based approach. In United States v. Ellis,86 the Tenth Circuit 
found that the district court committed error under the holding of 
Alleyne by sentencing the defendant “without the jury’s having found 
his individually attributable amount of cocaine.”87 While the court 
concluded that the district court erred in the sentencing of the defendant, 
the court nevertheless based the sentence on the holding in the previous 
circuit case of Untied States v. Stiger.88 The Ellis court understood 
Stiger to hold that the jury’s finding of the amount of drugs attributable 
to the conspiracy “sets the maximum sentence that each coconspirator 
could be given” but the judge has the authority to determine the 
minimum sentence for each defendant by making a decision as to the 
amount of controlled substance attributable to each individual defendant 
involved in the conspiracy.89 In Ellis, the Tenth Circuit, thus lessened 
 
 81. Id.  
 82. Id. Stoddard, 892 F.3d at 1219. 
 83. Id. at 1222; see Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 108 (2013) (holding that “[f]acts that 
increase the mandatory minimum sentence are therefore elements that must be submitted to the jury and 
found beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
 84. Stoddard, 892 F.3d at 1220.  
 85. Id. at 1222.  
 86. United States v. Ellis, 868 F.3d 1155 (10th Cir. 2017). 
 87. Id. at 1170.  
 88. Id. at 1178; United States v. Stiger, 413 F.3d 1185 (10th Cir. 2005).  
 89. Ellis, 868 F.3d at 1175 (quoting United States v. Stiger, 413 F.3d at 1192 (10th Cir. 2005)).  
10
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the precedential value of the Stiger decision.90  
The Sixth Circuit has also recently reviewed the conspiracy-wide 
approach in its decisions in United States v. Gibson91 and United States 
v. Young.92 In 2008, the Sixth Circuit seemingly adopted the 
conspiracy-wide approach in United States v. Robinson.93 In Robinson, 
the jury was instructed to determine whether the defendant, Robinson, 
“knowingly joined the conspiracy” and what “quantity [of drugs] [were] 
involved in the conspiracy,” but not whether Robinson had knowledge 
of the conspiracy wide quantity of the drugs.94 Robinson was convicted 
and sentenced to life.95 The Sixth Circuit upheld the jury instructions 
and subsequent conviction by reasoning that the district court was 
unable to determine the “amount or kind of drugs for which Robinson 
was personally responsible” because there was no minimum or 
maximum sentencing range for Robinson.96  
This conspiracy-based approach taken in Robinson has recently been 
revisited in both Young and Gibson. In United States v. Young, the 
defendants Young, Duncan, Parnell, and Vance were indicted on 
conspiracy to “distribute and possess with intent to distribute controlled 
substances.”97 On appeal, Parnell argued that the district court erred in 
sentencing by not allowing the jury to find the amount of controlled 
substance attributable to him.98 The Sixth Circuit held that even though 
the Sixth Circuit had issued contradictory opinions on how the 
mandatory minimum should be determined, Parnell’s sentence would be 
the same under either approach, thus refusing to clarify the contradictory 
opinions.99 The court examined the facts under the individualized 
approach and found that the life sentence of Parnell was appropriate 
because “the quantity of cocaine and crack cocaine required for 
conviction . . . were within the scope of the conspiracy of which Parnell 
was a part and was reasonably attributable to Parnell.”100 The court 
reasoned that because Parnell obtained his drugs from the “kingpin of 
the conspiracy” and had knowledge that other members of the 
conspiracy were manufacturing and possessing the narcotics, the amount 
 
 90. Ellis, 868 F.3d at 1178.  
 91. United States v. Gibson, 874 F.3d 544 (6th Cir. 2017). 
 92. United States v. Young, 847 F.3d 328 (6th Cir. 2017). 
 93. United States v. Robinson, 547 F.3d 632 (6th Cir. 2008). 
 94. Id. at 637.  
 95. Id.  
 96. Id. at 640.  
 97. Young, 847 F.3d at 338.  
 98. Id. at 365.  
 99. Id. at 367.  
 100. Id.  
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of the entire conspiracy was reasonably attributable to him.101 
In the Sixth Circuit case Gibson, the defendant, Gibson, appealed his 
sentence for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine arguing that in 
his plea “he never admitted that it was reasonably foreseeable to him” 
that the conspiracy involved the amount of drugs prescribed under the 
statute.102 The district court followed the Robinson precedent that “the 
relevant quantity determination is the quantity involved in the 
conspiracy.”103 Subsequently, the Sixth Circuit reheard Gibson’s appeal 
of his sentence en banc.104 However, the en banc court divided evenly 
and upheld the district court’s sentence.105 
III. DISCUSSION  
In sentencing an individual defendant charged with, and convicted of, 
conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance under 21 U.S.C. § 846, 
federal courts should determine the mandatory minimum sentence based 
upon the amount of controlled substance which is specifically 
attributable to each individual defendant. In determining the amount 
attributable to individual defendants, courts and juries must base this 
finding on the amount of controlled substance that was either directly 
attributable, or reasonably foreseeable, to each individual defendant. On 
this issue, circuits are divided regarding whether to continue using a 
conspiracy-based approach or adopt the defendant-advantageous, 
individualized approach. Most recently, the District of Columbia Circuit 
Court in United States v. Stoddard shifted from the previous position of 
using the conspiracy-based approach to using an individualized 
approach in determining the mandatory minimum for conspiracy to 
distribute drugs. In Stoddard, the D.C. Circuit grounded their argument 
on both legal precedents and persuasive reasoning. The rationale put 
forth by Stoddard is the correct interpretation courts should determine 
the issue of whether to use the individualized or conspiracy-wide 
approach when determining the mandatory minimum for conspiracy to 
distribute drugs.  
This discussion section will first explore the rationale the D.C. Circuit 
used in United States v. Stoddard by evaluating the court’s reliance on 
Supreme Court and circuit court precedent when determining the 
mandatory minimum sentence for conspiracy to distribute a controlled 
 
 101. Id. at 367-68.  
 102. United States v. Gibson, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 21141 at *1 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 103. United States v. Gibson, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 21141 at *3.  
 104. United States v. Gibson, 874 F.3d 544 (6th Cir. 2017). 
 105. Id.  
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substance. Second, this section will discuss various policy reasons 
supporting the individualized approach, including various instances of 
the Government’s support of the use of the individualized approach and 
the immense number of individuals in federal prison serving sentences 
for controlled substance crimes which carry lengthy mandatory 
minimums. Finally, this discussion will look at how circuits are moving 
toward adopting the individualized approach, including the various 
shifts in the Sixth Circuit that demonstrate support for the use of the 
individualized approach, as well as the potential for adopting that 
approach in the near future.  
A. The Stoddard court properly analyzed Supreme Court and circuit 
precedent to affirm the use of the individualized approach. 
A primary case the Stoddard court relied upon in their determination 
to utilize the individualized approach was Alleyne v. United States. The 
court properly relied on this precedent in finding for the individualized 
approach for multiple reasons. First, the Supreme Court in Alleyne held 
that when there is a fact that has the potential to increase the sentencing 
range for a defendant, that fact should be considered as an element of 
the crime.106 The Court reasoned that because these “aggravating facts” 
cause a defendant to face a higher statutory penalty, a jury must find that 
the prosecution proved these facts beyond a reasonable doubt before it 
can cause a defendant to face a harsher penalty.107  
The legal analysis set forth in Alleyne provides guidance to the circuit 
courts on how to evaluate and decide whether to adopt the conspiracy or 
individualized approach when determining mandatory minimum 
sentences for conspiracy to distribute cases.108 The holding in Alleyne 
clearly delineates that there are instances under various federal statutory 
penalties where the jury must make a finding of fact before the court has 
the ability to impose a lengthier sentence upon a defendant.109 As this 
holding in Alleyne is broad, it is applicable to the elements of various 
federal crimes. The rationale serves as a foundation from which courts 
can determine what facts are, or are not, “aggravating facts” for an 
individual defendant and, thus, determine the appropriate sentence to be 
imposed.  
The decision to find that circuits should follow the individualized 
approach is additionally bolstered by the Supreme Court’s holding in 
 
 106. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 115-116 (2013). 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id.  
 109. Id.  
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Burrage v. United States.110 When interpreting the holding of the 
Burrage case, the Stoddard court properly analogized the death 
enhancement for a conspiracy case to the type and quantity of drugs 
attributable to a defendant in a conspiracy case.111 The statute that 
describes the base-level offenses for the drug crimes distinguishes the 
sentences for those offenses by both the type of drug and the quantity of 
said drug. In Burrage, the Supreme Court found that the enhancement 
for a death resulting from the distribution of drugs was a factor that a 
jury had to consider when reaching a verdict. Because Burrage directly 
advanced the principle that a jury must determine the factual finding of 
the offense and enhancement before a court can impose the mandatory 
minimum for that enhancement, the Stoddard court properly applied that 
rationale to the mandatory minimum sentence for various drug 
quantities.  
While not expressly described as enhancements, the specific quantity 
and type of controlled substance as prescribed under 21 U.S.C. § 841 
alters the sentence a defendant may receive for possession or 
distribution of a drug.112 When a jury or judge makes the factual finding 
as to the amount and type of drug applicable to each defendant, this 
factual finding increases the possible sentence which the defendant may 
receive under § 841. In viewing this factual finding as an enhancement, 
it is clear that the courts are then required to follow the principle put 
forth in Burrage: the enhancement must be determined by a jury. 
Therefore, this enhancement standard set forth in Burrage is directly 
applicable to the imbedded enhancement of the sentence based on type 
and quantity of controlled substances in the drug offense statute.  
Finally, the Stoddard court looked to its own circuit’s decision in 
Untied States v. Law113 to support its finding to utilize the 
individualized approach.114 In Law, the D.C. Circuit held that when a 
defendant is convicted of conspiracy to distribute, the sentence must be 
based on the “quantity of drugs that the jury attributes to him as a 
reasonably foreseeable part of the conspiracy.”115 While the Stoddard 
court acknowledged that Law was distinguishable from Stoddard, as 
they did not directly rule on the individualized issue in Law, the court 
did find that the Law decision supports the finding of the individualized 
 
 110. Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014). 
 111. United States v. Stoddard, 892 F.3d 1203, 1222 (D.C. Cir. 2018). 
 112. 21 U.S.C. § 841 (LexisNexis, Lexis Advance through PL 115-385, approved 12/21/18, with 
a gap of PL 115-334). 
 113. United States v. Law, 528 F.3d 888 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
 114. Stoddard, 892 F.3d at 1221-1222.  
 115. Law, 528 F.3d at 906.  
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approach in determining drug quantity for sentencing.116 The Stoddard 
court correctly rationalized and interpreted the Law decision in adopting 
the individualized approach. While the Law decision is not dispositive 
on the issue of how mandatory minimums should be determined for 
conspiracy to distribute, the fact that the court held that the jury must 
determine the amount of controlled substance reasonably foreseeable to 
the defendant as part of the conspiracy is indicative of the court desiring 
to sentence a defendant for the limited quantity of controlled substance 
of which he or she knew. 
B. Policy reasons supporting the adoption of the individualized 
approach 
One persuasive policy argument supporting the position that the 
federal courts should apply the individual based approach is that, in 
multiple cases on this issue, the Government has asserted that the 
individualized approach should be utilized.117 In the Stoddard opinion, 
the D.C. Circuit correctly noted, and took into consideration, the 
Government’s support of the individualized approach. In the 
Government’s final brief on the Stoddard appeal, it was conceded that 
the Government, at trial, argued that the jury should be charged with 
utilizing the individualized approach and make the determination of the 
quantity of drugs attributable to each individual defendant.118 
Furthermore, in the Fifth Circuit’s decision in United States v. 
Haines, the court also acknowledged that the Government agreed that 
the proper approach for determining the mandatory minimum should be 
based on the jury’s finding as to the amount of controlled substance 
attributable to or reasonably foreseeable to each individual defendant.119 
Moreover, the Government again supported the individualized approach 
in United States v. Young.120 In Young, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged 
the Government’s assertion that the Government utilizes the 
individualized approach when determining the appropriate charges for 
individuals accused of conspiracy to distribute controlled substances and 
other conspiracy charges.121  
 
 116. Stoddard, 892 F.3d at 1221-1222 (distinguishing United States v. Law, 528 F.3d 888, finding 
that Law dealt with whether a violation of §846 encompasses all crimes in the conspiracy that were 
reasonably foreseeable to the defendant.)  
 117. E.g. Stoddard, 892 F.3d at 1222; United States v. Young, 847 F.3d 328, 367 n.3 (6th Cir. 
2017); United States v. Haines, 803 F.3d 713,738 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 118. Final Brief for Appellee at 65, United States v. Stoddard, 892 F.3d 1203 (D.C. Cir. 2018) 
(No. 15-3060). 
 119. Haines, 803 F.3d at 738.  
 120. Young, 847 F.3d at 367 n.3. 
 121. Id.  
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As is clear from these opinions, the Government, along with 
defendants, have taken the stance that an individualized approach should 
be utilized when determining the mandatory minimum for conspiracy to 
distribute a controlled substance. Because both parties find the 
individualized approach to be appropriate in determining the mandatory 
minimum sentences, the circuit courts should heed this guidance and 
support, and adopt the individualized approach. When both parties agree 
to a sentence or sentencing scheme, it is often apparent that these parties 
arrive at the conclusion due to the belief that it is the best policy 
decision and in the best interest of both parties. When the circuit courts 
continue to utilize the conspiracy-based approach, these courts are 
undermining the Government’s reasoned decision of the how cases of 
this type should be handled. These courts should align themselves with 
the Government’s approach that the mandatory minimum for conspiracy 
to distribute a controlled substance should be determined by the amount 
attributable to or reasonably foreseeable to the individual defendant.  
A second policy reason supporting the shift toward utilizing the 
individualized approach is the large number of individuals in federal 
prison for lengthy drug sentences.122 In October 2017, the United States 
Sentencing Commission released a report based on their 2016 findings 
regarding the impact of mandatory minimum sentences on individuals 
charged and sentenced with federal drug offenses.123 While it does 
acknowledge that “[t]he most commonly prosecuted drug offenses that 
carry mandatory minimum penalties are 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 960,” this 
report also discusses every drug offense that carries a mandatory 
minimum penalty.124 
The data collected by the U.S. Sentencing Commission demonstrates 
that in 2016, convictions under the conspiracy statute, 21 U.S.C. § 846, 
were one of the “most frequently used statutes carrying a mandatory 
minimum penalty.”125 The report found that 21 U.S.C. § 846 accounted 
for almost 6,000, or approximately 25%, of federal drug offenders 
serving a mandatory minimum sentence for a controlled substance 
offense.126 Additionally, most offenders, almost 50%, who are convicted 
of a drug offense that carries a mandatory minimum penalty are 
Category I offenders127—meaning that these offenders have 0 to 1 
criminal history points.128 Therefore, these offenders are individuals 
 
 122. See generally, U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2017 Overview, supra note 5. 
 123. Id. at 2. 
 124. Id.at 10. 
 125. Id. at 15. 
 126. Id. at Table 1. 
 127. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2017 Overview, supra note 5, Table 3. 
 128. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL Ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing table (U.S. SENTENCING 
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who have had very few, if any, prior convictions for other offenses. 
Additionally, when reviewing the length of the mandatory minimum 
sentences for drug offenders, the Commission found that “offenders who 
remained subject to a drug mandatory minimum penalty at sentencing” 
had an average sentence length of 126 months.”129 
One main distinction between individuals convicted of controlled 
substance offenses are their roles and functions in a “drug distribution 
chain.”130 The United States Sentencing Commission has created 
twenty-one categories for each function in the distribution chain based 
on the conduct of the individual.131 The “ten most common functions”132 
performed by individuals in a distribution chain include functions such 
as importer/high level supplier, organizer, manager, street-level dealer, 
mule, and employee.133 The Sentencing Commission has defined a 
street-level dealer as an individual who “[d]istributes retail quantities 
directly to the user; sells less than 1 ounce (28 grams) quantities to any 
user(s).”134 While these street-level dealers do not deal large quantities 
of controlled substances to users, in 2016, these individuals comprised 
just over 16% of mandatory minimum drug offenders, second only to 
courier’s at 18.6%.135 However, these street-level dealers who were 
convicted and subject to mandatory minimum sentences received an 
average sentence of only 97 months, compared to the 186 month and the 
156 month sentences of individuals who were organizers/leaders or who 
were managers/supervisors, respectively.136 
Based on this data provided by the United States Sentencing 
Commission, it is obvious that there is a great need to reduce the 
sentences for low-level drug offenders. Since convictions under § 846, 
the conspiracy statute, make up almost a quarter of controlled substance 
convictions carrying a mandatory minimum penalty, it is clear that the 
manner which the mandatory minimum is determined for that offense 
can have an impact on the sentences of a large number of individuals 
charged with federal drug crimes. Further, many individuals who are 
charged with drug crimes are low level members of drug conspiracies 
 
COMM’N 2018) (Shows that as an individual obtains more criminal history points on their record, the 
Criminal History Category of the Sentencing Table likewise increases). 
 129. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2017 Overview, supra note 5, at 37.  
 130. Id. at 43. 
 131. Id. (however, the “report only presents data on the ten most common functions.”). 
 132. Id.  
 133. Id. at 44. 
 134. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, 2017 Overview, supra note 5, at 44. 
 135. Id. at 45 (A courier is defined as an individual who “[t]ransports or carries drugs with the 
assistance of a vehicle or other equipment.” Id. at 44). 
 136. Id. at fig. 33. 
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and organizations, such as street-level dealers or employees. However, 
these street-level dealers, who are distributing comparatively small 
quantities of controlled substances, still receive an average mandatory 
minimum sentence for a drug offense of just over eight years. This 
average mandatory minimum for street level dealers is only about five to 
seven years lower than the average mandatory minimum sentence for an 
organizer of a conspiracy.  
These high average mandatory minimum sentences for individuals 
distributing small quantities of drugs show a need for courts to adopt 
sentencing policies that will provide lower mandatory minimums for 
low-level dealers. By adopting the individualized approach over the 
conspiracy-based approach, individuals will only be liable for the 
amount they actually possessed or sold, or the amount that was 
reasonably foreseeable or attributable to them, thus potentially making 
their mandatory minimum penalty lower than if they were sentenced 
based on the amount of drugs attributable to the entire conspiracy. 
Following the individual based approach would allow courts to keep 
individuals who served low-level functions from serving long and unjust 
prison sentences. 
C. Multiple circuits, such as the Sixth Circuit and Tenth Circuit, should 
follow the guidance of Stoddard and change their standard to the 
individualized approach. 
While many circuits have adopted the individualized approach in 
determining drug quantity for conspiracy to distribute,137 multiple 
circuits are still adhering to precedent that embraces the conspiracy-
wide approach.138 One circuit that has recently upheld the conspiracy-
based approach is the Sixth Circuit, in in United States v. Gibson and 
United States v. Young. While the Sixth Circuit may have upheld the 
conspiracy-based approach, there are multiple indicators showing that, 
in the future, the Sixth Circuit may come to embrace the individualized 
approach.  
First, in the Sixth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Gibson, the 
court, upon hearing the case en banc, issued a split decision on whether 
the defendant’s conspiracy based mandatory minimum sentence was 
proper and should be upheld.139 The divided court indicates that there is 
 
 137. E.g., United States v. Pizarro, 772 F.3d 284 (1st Cir. 2014); Untied United States v. Rangel, 
781 F.3d 736 (4th Cir. 2015); United States v. Haines, 803 F.3d 713 (5th Cir. 2015); United States v. 
Banuelos, 322 F.3d 700 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 138. E.g. United States v. Phillips, 349 F.3d 138 (3d Cir. 2003), vacated on other grounds, 
Barbour v. United States, 543 U.S. 1102 (2005); United States v. Knight, 342 F.3d 697 (7th Cir. 2003). 
 139. United States v. Gibson, 874 F.3d 544, 544 (6th Cir. 2017). 
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a possibility the court may shift away from the conspiracy-based 
approach and to the individualized approach in the future. This shift 
toward considering the utilization of the individualized approach has the 
possibility of occurring on similar future cases because mere months 
before Gibson was decided, the Sixth Circuit refused to reconcile their 
conflicting opinions on this issue in their decision in United States v. 
Young. Although the Young court refused to resolve this issue in that 
particular case, they found that when using either approach, all of the 
controlled substances in that specific conspiracy were reasonably 
foreseeable to the individual defendants.140 While the court refused to 
reconcile the conflicting opinions on the quantity determination, this 
shows that the court might have wanted to hold open the possibility of 
taking a future, on-point case on this issue to utilize the individualized 
approach.  
While the Sixth Circuit has not directly overruled or affirmed the use 
of the conspiracy-based approach in recent cases, the pattern jury 
instructions for the Sixth Circuit show a support of the individualized 
approach.141 The pattern jury instructions are drafted by a committee 
that is comprised of Untied States Attorneys, Federal Public Defenders, 
defense attorneys, District Court judges, and professors (the 
“Committee”).142 These pattern jury instructions are created by the 
Committee to provide guidance to the courts when instructing juries 
during trials.143 These instructions are only officially approved by ruling 
of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals through “a case-by-case review,” 
as the instructions “should be tailored to fit the facts of each individual 
case.”144  
The pattern jury instruction for determining the amount of controlled 
substance states that the jury must “determine the quantity of the 
controlled substance involved in the conspiracy that was attributable to 
him as the result of his own conduct and the conduct of other co-
conspirators that was reasonably foreseeable to him.”145 This instruction 
clearly directs the jury to utilize the individualized approach in 
determining the drug quantity for which the defendant is responsible for 
in a drug conspiracy case. The aforementioned language is repeated in 
the subsequent subsections of the instruction for determining quantity of 
 
 140. United States v. Young, 847 F.3d 328, 367 (6th Cir. 2017). 
 141. SIXTH CIRCUIT COMMITTEE ON PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Pattern Criminal 
Jury Instructions, ch. 14.07B 
http://www.ca6.uscourts.gov/sites/ca6/files/documents/pattern_jury/pdf/crmpattjur_full_0.pdf (updated 
Jan. 1, 2019). 
 142. Id. at Sixth Circuit Pattern Criminal Jury Instruction Committee 2019.  
 143. Id. at intro. 
 144. Id. at intro.  
 145. Id. at Ch. 14.07B(1).  
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a controlled substance. The subsequent two sections, 14.07(B)(2) and 
(3), of the instruction repeat the phrase the “amount of [name of 
controlled substance] was attributable to the defendant as the result of 
his own conduct and the conduct of other co-conspirators that was 
reasonably foreseeable to him.”146 
In its commentary to this jury instruction, the Committee addressed 
the inconsistencies in the Sixth Circuit’s determination of the mandatory 
minimum for conspiracy to distribute drugs and other drug conspiracy 
offenses.147 The Committee found that the determination of the 
mandatory minimum should be bound by the older precedent of United 
States v. Swiney,148 rather than the recent decisions of cases, such as 
Gibson and Young.149 In United States v. Swiney, the Sixth Circuit held 
that the mandatory minimum sentence for an individual under 21 U.S.C. 
§§ 841 and 846 should be determined based on the reasonably 
foreseeable analysis as set forth in U.S.S.G. §1B1.3(a)(1)(B).150 The 
Swiney court reasoned that the “Sentencing Guidelines have modified 
the Pinkerton theory” of conspirator liability thus making that case law 
consistent with the goal of giving sentences based on the conduct done 
by the individual defendant.151 Based on the precedent of the Swiney 
decision, the Committee amended the pattern jury instruction to “delete 
the phrase ‘involved in the conspiracy as a whole’ throughout the 
text.”152 Further, the Committee went on to create special verdict forms 
which also omitted language regarding the conspiracy-wide approach, 
and replaced that language with a charge to the jury to utilize the 
individualized approach and determine the quantity of the drugs 
attributable to or reasonably foreseeable to the defendant.153  
By acknowledging what the Committee believes to be the proper 
precedent for drug conspiracy sentencing and by changing the language 
of the pattern jury instructions, the Committee is asserting to the Sixth 
Circuit that the court should clearly adopt the individualized approach. 
The amendments to this section of the jury instructions demonstrates a 
 
 146. SIXTH CIRCUIT COMMITTEE ON PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 142, 
ch. 14.07B(2); Id. at ch. 14.07(B)(3) (emphasis added). 
 147. SIXTH CIRCUIT COMMITTEE ON PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 142, at 
ch. 14.07B, committee cmt. ¶ 2. 
 148. United States v. Swinney, 203 F.3d 397 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 149. SIXTH CIRCUIT COMMITTEE ON PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 142, at 
ch. 14.07B, committee cmt. ¶ 2. 
 150. Id. at 405-406.  
 151. Id. at 404.  
 152. SIXTH CIRCUIT COMMITTEE ON PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 142, 
ch. 14.07B, committee cmt. ¶ 2. 
 153. Id.; See. e.g. SIXTH CIRCUIT COMMITTEE ON PATTERN CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra 
note 142, Special Verdict Form §846, Form 14.07B-1.  
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clear desire by the legal community to turn away from the conspiracy-
based approach to the individualized approach. While these pattern jury 
instructions are not binding and are used only as a guide for the district 
courts, these amendments demonstrate yet another indicator that there 
may be a change to the Sixth Circuit’s jurisprudence on this issue. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
In light of the Stoddard decision and weighty policy objectives, it is 
clear that all circuit courts use the amount of controlled substance 
attributable to or reasonably foreseeable to a defendant as the standard 
when determining the mandatory minimum sentence for a conspiracy to 
distribute drugs charge. The decision in Stoddard provides a clear and 
correct analysis of the  precedent. Further, the United States Sentencing 
Committee research demonstrates that mandatory minimum sentences 
are lengthy for low-level offenders in drug conspiracies and that 
conspiracy charges account for almost a quarter of drug offenses with 
mandatory minimum sentences. Therefore, to combat high prison 
populations, to provide just sentences for the crimes an individual 
actually committed, and to align with Government charging decisions in 
conspiracy to distribute cases, circuit courts should adopt the 
individualized approach for determining the mandatory minimum for 
conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance.  
Additionally, the Sixth Circuit, and other circuits questioning the 
proper approach to determining the mandatory minimum sentence, 
should take note of the shifting opinions of the legal community and 
apply the individualized approach in their opinions. Based on the clear 
support of the legal community and sound legal rationale for utilizing 
the individualized approach, the Sixth Circuit should follow the 
Stoddard court by reassessing a case on this issue and finding that the 
mandatory minimum for conspiracy to distribute drugs should be 
determined based on the amount of drugs attributable to or reasonably 
foreseeable to the individual defendant. 
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